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ABSTRACT
With the advent of Industry 4.0, cloud computing techniques have been increasingly
adopted by industry practitioners to achieve better workflows. One important appli-
cation is cloud-based decision-making, in which multiple enterprise partners need to
arrive an agreed decision. Such cooperative decision-making problem is sometimes
formed as a weighted voting game, in which enterprise partners express ‘YES/NO’
opinions. Nevertheless, existing cryptographic approaches to Cloud-Based Weighted
Voting Game have restricted collusion tolerance and heavily rely on trusted servers,
which are not always available. In this work, we consider the more realistic sce-
narios of having semi-honest cloud server/partners and assuming maximal collusion
tolerance. To resolve the privacy issues in such scenarios, the DPWeVote protocol
is proposed which incorporates Randomized Response technique and consists the
following three phases: the Randomized Weights Collection phase, the Randomized
Opinions Collection phase, and the Voting Results Release phase. Experiments on
synthetic data have demonstrated that the proposed DPWeVote protocol managed
to retain an acceptable utility for decision-making while preserving privacy in semi-
honest environment.
KEYWORDS
Industry 4.0; Cloud-Based Design and Manufacturing; Cloud-Based
Decision-Making; Weighted Voting; Differential Privacy
1. Introduction
As the fourth industrial revolution, Industry 4.0 aims to achieve the distributed, col-
laborative and automated design & manufacturing workflow, by taking advantages of
the increasingly sophisticated technologies of Internet of Things, Cloud Computing
and Big Data (Thames and Schaefer 2017). In recent years, the Cloud-Based Design
and Manufacturing (CBDM) (Wu et al. 2012, 2013; Schaefer 2014) has become a
fundamental paradigm that may fulfill the basic requirements of Industry 4.0 and has
attracted widespread attentions from both academia and industry. On the basis of
CBDM, advanced information systems such as the Cloud ERP (Enterprise Resource
Planning) system (Symonds 2012; Synergy 2015; Cisco 2015) have been developed
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and deployed to help the enterprise partners to achieve better resource scheduling and
collaborative decision-making tasks (Cloud 2016; ERP 2016). In this way, the pattern
of Cloud-Based Decision-Making would be of great benefit to all kinds of enterprise
partners with the trend of Industry 4.0. Meanwhile, the Cooperative Games (Branzei,
Dimitrov, and Tijs 2008) would also contribute to the cloud-based decision-making
as it has done to the traditional decision-making. Among them, the Weighted Vot-
ing Game, in which the voters have diverse weights, can be regarded as a possible
process for cloud-based decision-making in the scenario of Industry 4.0, based on the
real-world situations (Steinberger 2007).
However, in a weighted voting game for cloud-based decision-making, there exist
potential privacy leakages towards the weight wi and voting opinion φi, which are
owned by each enterprise partner (voter) i and need to be uploaded to cloud server for
voting result computation, especially under the assumption of semi-honest cloud server
and partners. In this way, the sensitive information such as the weight of an enterprise
partner and his/her attitude towards the given elected candidate are exposed to the
cloud server as well as to the other enterprise partners, which harms the long-term
interests of industry or business.
There have been some researches on the design of secure weighted voting protocol by
adopting cryptographic approach such as homomorphic encryption (Nakanishi et al.
2004; Chen, Lin, and Wang 2013; Zhang et al. 2016), but these works have limits on
the controlled assumption about collusion, and/or on the setting of additional trusted
servers.
In this paper, we aim to design a private data collection protocol to tackle the
privacy issues in the weighted voting game for cloud-based decision-making, as well
as with the assumptions that the involved entities are all semi-honest and the maxi-
mum collusion may occur among them. Moreover, in order to rigorously measure and
prove the degree of privacy protection in the proposed protocol, we consider the Lo-
cal Differential Privacy (LDP) model (Kasiviswanathan et al. 2008; Duchi, Jordan,
and Wainwright 2012, 2013), which originates from the Differential Privacy (DP)
model (Dwork et al. 2006; Dwork 2011) and is particularly suitable for the scenario
of private data collection. As inheriting the basic privacy-preserving characteristics
from the DP model, LDP ensures that the cloud server cannot confidently (measured
by privacy parameter ) infer the present or absent status of a single record in each
distributed partner’s original database by just observing the uploaded data from each
partner.
Although there have been some existing researches on differentially private voting
such as Chen et al. (2013); Leung and Lui (2012); Lee (2015); Hay, Elagina, and
Miklau (2017), these methods do not consider the scenario of weighted voting, where
the weights data are diverse and should also be protected. To our best knowledge, the
differentially private weighted voting game is a novel problem. The contributions in
this paper include the following:
• We first research and formulate the differentially private weighted voting game, in
which the cloud server and the partners are assumed to be semi-honest, and both
of weights and opinions should be protected. Furthermore, the partners weights
are classified into three groups wI, wII and wIII, for directly simulating the
high, middle and low level decision-making power in real-world scenario, from
which the intuition of double RR mechanism based protocol is driven.
• We adopt the Randomized Response (RR) technique to design a differentially
private weighted voting protocol DPWeVote, which satisfies the local differential
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privacy. There are three phases within the proposed protocol, in which we sepa-
rately apply RR in the phases 1 and 2 for first enabling the partners to perturb
their weights wi and opinions φi data locally and then enabling the cloud server
to estimate useful population statistics of the partners without disclosing their
individual data. In the third phase, the cloud server only needs to compute the
final voting result by judging whether the estimated summation
∑
i∈N ŵi · φi
is larger than the estimated quota q̂. Finally the voting result regarding the
candidate will be released.
• We evaluate the Accuracy and Mean Squared Error (MSE) of differentially
private weighted voting game on synthetic data, showing that the proposed
DPWeVote protocol always outperforms the baseline algorithm which leverages
the laplace mechanism, under varying the parameters  (privacy budget) and n
(numbers of partners). Generally, the DPWeVote can attain an acceptable data
utility in a narrow range of  (from 0.1 to 1.0), and a high data utility in a wider
range (larger than 1.0), which is consistent with most of the existing researches
on RR-based local differential privacy algorithm.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. We present the preliminaries and
related works in Section 2, and provide the problem statement in Section 3. Section 4
is devoted to describing the DPWeVote protocol for achieving the differentially private
weighted voting game, followed by its theoretical privacy analysis. Section 5 presents
experimental results, and conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2. Preliminaries and Related Work
This section reviews three fundamental concepts: Cooperative Games, Weighted Voting
Game and Local Differential Privacy, and then briefly surveys the related works in
Privacy-preserving Voting Games and Local Differential Privacy.
Table 1 lists the relevant notations used in this paper.
2.1. Preliminaries
2.1.1. Cooperative Game
In the game theory, the most difference between the cooperative games and the non-
cooperative games is that the former would consider to model the behaviours and
associated payoffs of groups (or called coalitions), instead of considering that of the
individual partner. In general, the cooperative games are also known as the coalition
games, whose definition with transferable utility assumption is given as:
Definition 2.1 (Coalition Game with Transferable Utility (Leyton-Brown and
Shoham 2008)). A coalition game with transferable utility is a pair (N, v), where
• N is a finite or infinite set of partners, indexed by i; and
• The characteristic function v : 2N → R associates with each coalition C ⊆ N
a real-valued payoff (or called worth) v(C) that the coalition’s members can
distribute among themselves.
In the view of cooperative game theory, the enterprise partners, who may control
the distributed manufacturing resources, can be seen as the self-interested players and
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Table 1. Summary of Notation
Symbol Meaning
N the set of partners i ∈ N = {1, ..., n}
v the characteristic function
C the coalitions which are formed by partners
K the set of proposal candidates l ∈ K = {1, ..., k}
wi the weight adhere to each partner i for wi ∈ w = {w1, ..., wn} ∈ {1, 2, 3}n
in the game defined in this paper
w˜i the perturbed weight adhere to each partner i
wI weight group I in which the weights of members are set to 1,
wI = {wj1 = 1, j1 ∈ [1,m1]}
wII weight group II in which the weights of members are set to 2,
wII = {wj2 = 2, j2 ∈ [1,m2]}
wIII weight group III in which the weights of members are set to 3,
wIII = {wj3 = 3, j3 ∈ [1,m3]}
φi the opinion adhere to each partner i, and φi ∈ φ = {φ1, ..., φn} ∈ {0, 1}n
φ˜i the perturbed opinion adhere to each partner i
φY the ‘Yes’ opinion group in which the opinions of members are set to 1
φN the ‘No’ opinion group in which the opinions of members are set to 0
q the quota of weights that a passed proposal candidate must raise
q̂ the approximate quota which is estimated by the cloud server
Mw the transformation matrix of weights
Mφ the transformation matrix of opinions
 overall privacy budget
also intend to cooperate with others for better profits. In other words, these partners
would make decisions or take actions based on all-win cooperative attitude.
2.1.2. Weighted Voting Game
Being one of the simplest useful cooperative games, the weighted voting game consid-
ers the model settings where each partner has certain weight for voting a given pro-
posal candidate. Any coalition whose member’s weights summation exceeds a threshold
would be the winning coalition and get the proposal candidate passed. The game can
be formally defined as the following:
Definition 2.2 (Weighted Voting Game (Chalkiadakis, Elkind, and Wooldridge
2011)). A weighted voting game G with a set of partners N = {1, ..., n} is given
by a list of weights w = {w1, ..., wn} ∈ Rn and a quota q ∈ R; the game will be written
G = [N ; w; q]. Its characteristic function v : 2N → {0, 1} of each coalition C ⊆ N is
given by
v(C) =
1 if
∑
i∈C
wi ≥ q,
0 otherwise.
In general, the quota q belongs to (0,
∑
i∈N wi], which ensures that the empty coali-
tion would lose the voting. In this paper, it is convenient and realistic to assume that
q = 12
∑
i∈N wi.
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2.1.3. Local Differential Privacy
The Local Differential Privacy (LDP) (Kasiviswanathan et al. 2008; Duchi, Jordan,
and Wainwright 2012, 2013) is a distributed privacy model for data collection and
analysis, which derives from the following traditional definition of Differential Pri-
vacy (Dwork et al. 2006; Dwork 2011):
Definition 2.3 (-Differential Privacy). A randomized algorithm M gives -
differential privacy if for all neighbour databases D and D′ differing in at most one
record, and for all O ⊆ Range(M), we have
Pr[M(D) ∈ O] ≤ e · Pr[M(D′) ∈ O].
The intuition behind the above definition is that the adversary cannot confidently
distinguish the two outputs of a differentially private algorithm M when inputting
database D and its neighbor database D′. That is, the present or absent status of a
single record within input database is rigorously protected with the uncertainty of the
algorithm’s outputs, which is measured by the privacy parameter (also called privacy
budget) . Besides, algorithmM is associated with the sensitivity, which measures the
maximum change on the result of query function f when one record from D changes:
Definition 2.4 (Sensitivity). For any function f : D → Rd, and for all D, D′ differing
in at most one record, the sensitivity of f is 4f = max
D,D′
‖f(D)− f(D′)‖1.
To satisfy the definition of differential privacy and for those query functions f
which have numeric output, the Laplace mechanism are usually utilized. It relies on
the strategy of adding the Laplacian noise Laplace(·) to the query result, and can be
formally defined as follows.
Definition 2.5 (Laplace Mechanism). Given a function f : D → Rd, the Laplace
mechanism is defined as:
ML(D) = f(D) + (Y1, ..., Yd),
where Yi are i.i.d random variables drawn from Laplace(
4f
 ).
To guarantee the overall privacy budget  when it comes to a sequence of differen-
tially private operations, we have the following composition property:
Theorem 2.6 (Sequential Composition (McSherry 2009)). Given n independent ran-
domized algorithms M1,M2, ...,Mn where Mi(1 ≤ i ≤ n) satisfies i-differential
privacy, a sequence of Mi over the dataset S satisfies -differential privacy, where
 =
∑n
1 (i).
In LDP model, each distributed partner would first perturb his/her data locally by
adopting a randomized mechanism (or called local randomizer R) which is provided
by the semi-honest cloud server and satisfies -differential privacy, and then upload
the perturbed data to cloud server, who cannot infer the sensitive information of every
single partner but can post-process those data to obtain useful population statistics
for further analysis. The LDP can be formally defined as follows:
Definition 2.7 (Local Differential Privacy (Bassily et al. 2017)). An algorithm satis-
fies -Local Differential Privacy (LDP) if it accesses the database v = (v1, ..., vn) ∈ Vn
only via invocations of a local randomizer R and if for all i ∈ [n], if R(1), ...,R(k)
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denote the algorithms invocations of R on the data sample vi, then the algorithm
A(·) , (R(1)(·),R(2)(·), ...,R(k)(·)) is -differentially private. That is, if for any pair of
data samples v, v′ ∈ V and ∀S ⊆ Range(A), Pr[A(v) ∈ S] ≤ e · Pr[A(v′) ∈ S].
In recent years, the Randomized Response (RR) technique (Warner 1965; Chaudhuri
2016) has became the widely used mechanism that achieves LDP in an efficient and
effective way. As an original survey technique in statistics, RR allows the partners
who take participate in questionnaire survey have the opportunity to answer sensitive
questions with Plausible Deniability 1. Specifically, when being asked a question whose
answer can be either ‘yes’ or ‘no’, the partner is allowed to first flip a biased coin and
then gives his/her true answer to the investigator (or cloud server in our scenario)
if the coin turns head with a probability p, or otherwise reports the false answer.
In this way, the investigator (cloud server) cannot make sure whether the received
answer is the true one or the false one from the partner, since the answers have deep
relationship with p. Therefore, for a semi-honest partner who intends to follow the
above protocol honestly, the RR would provide him/her the possibility to generate
randomized answers to the cloud server and then guarantees their privacy protection
by granting them this plausible deniability.
Interestingly, it has pointed out that RR for binary attribute survey can be regarded
as a specific randomized algorithm that satisfies the -differential privacy, if the value
of coin flipping probability p has the following relationship with the privacy budget 
(Erlingsson, Pihur, and Korolova 2014; Bassily and Smith 2015; Wang, Wu, and Hu
2016):
p =
e
1 + e
. (1)
Next, we could use a transformation matrix M shown below to include the related
coin flipping probabilities pi,j which represent the probability that a true answer j is
transformed into the provided answer i. In this matrix, the number ‘0’ denotes the
answer ‘no’ while the number ‘1’ denotes the answer ‘yes’.
M =
(
p0,0 p0,1
p1,0 p1,1
)
=
(
p 1− p
1− p p
)
.
Then the reconstruction property of RR can be applied in the cloud server’s side.
Based on the knowledge of the above transformation matrix M , once the semi-honest
cloud server obtains y1 (or y0), the number of the partners who provide the answer
‘yes’ (or ‘no’), he/she would post-process this number to estimate x̂1 (or x̂0), the ap-
proximate number of the partners whose true answer are ‘yes’ (or ‘no’). The estimation
is an unbiased MLE (Maximum Likelihood Estimate) (Huang and Du 2008) and can
be executed by the following equation (Groat et al. 2013; Sei and Ohsuga 2017):
−→̂
X = M−1
−→
Y , (2)
where
−→̂
X = (x̂0, x̂1)
τ ,
−→
Y = (y0, y1)
τ , and M−1 is the inverse matrix of M.
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plausible˙deniability
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It is also notable that RR can prevent the maximum collusion attack in which the
cloud server and N − 1 of N partners collude with each other.
2.2. Related Work
2.2.1. Privacy-preserving Voting Games
Voting-based methods are one of the most common techniques for achieving group
decision-making. There are many researches on secure voting scheme analysis or de-
sign based on cryptographic techniques. For example, Springall et al. (2014) provided
a comprehensive security analysis of the Estonian I-voting system and pointed out
the potential attacks. Grewal et al. (2015) proposed a remote electronic voting pro-
tocol under the assumption of using untrusted computers. The hardware token is
needed to distribute the trust between the voter’s computer and the election author-
ities’ server. In the work of Will et al. (2015), a cloud-based mobile electronic voting
scheme was proposed by leveraging the Homomorphic Encryption technique. More-
over, the work suggested that using a dedicated hardware server for homomorphic
tallying and decryption. Park and Rivest (2017) proposed an secure implementation
of the Quadratic Voting scheme in which both the voting and payments should be
considered. In Rivest, Stark, and Perumal (2017) a specific framework BatchVote was
proposed, which is based on the finding of a family of social choice functions that can
ensure the ease of auditing. Bernhard et al. (2017) showed a comprehensive survey on
the secure voting requirements, the existing solutions, and the future research direc-
tions. In a latest doctoral thesis Riemann (2017), P2P based online voting protocols
were proposed to reduce the dependence on the trusted third parties and solely on
cryptographic techniques.
In terms of privacy protection for the cloud-based weighted voting game, Nakan-
ishi et al. (2004) proposed a weighted voting protocol with secret weights by using
Homomorphic Encryption technique. This work is based on the assumption that the
number of collusive servers cannot beyond the threshold K. Inspired by Nakanishi
et al. (2004), the work of Chen, Lin, and Wang (2013) developed a privacy-preserved
joint group time scheduling mechanism with the scenario that each user cannot know
his/her weight, and with the assumption of non-collusive users. Zhang et al. (2016)
proposed two privacy-friendly weighted-reputation aggregation protocols respectively
for the semi-honest adversary setting and malicious adversary setting, by adopting the
Homomorphic encryption and zero-knowledge proofs.
For the discussions on privacy notations, Bernhard et al. (2012) adopted the com-
putational conditional entropy to measure the privacy in voting schemes and provided
theoretical theorem to better analyse the privacy of both cryptographic voting proto-
cols and non-cryptographic protocols. They also demonstrated the connections of the
proposed privacy notation and two existing ones. In (Ashur, Dunkelman, and Talmon
2016), a privacy breaching algorithm was proposed to show the weakness of Israels pa-
per ballot voting system which is based on anonymization techniques. Talmon (2015)
studied the k-anonymizing preference orders in protecting privacy in elections.
From the aspects of the recent popular privacy model, differential privacy, McSherry
and Talwar (2007) initially built the bridge between mechanism design and differential
privacy, and proposed the Exponential mechanism especially for private auction. There
are some subsequent researches on private auction and its truthfulness such as (Nis-
sim, Smorodinsky, and Tennenholtz 2012; Xiao 2013). For private voting, in (Chen
et al. 2013), they proposed a novel way to incorporate differential privacy directly
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into the player’s utility functions, a private two-candidate elections mechanism was
designed. Leung and Lui (2012) considered the Bayesian setting of the distribution of
the players types and proposed the Bayesian differential privacy while achieving per-
sistent approximate truthfulness. Lee (2015) proposed an algorithm that satisfies both
-differential privacy and -strategyproof for protecting participant privacy in tourna-
ment voting rules. Recently, considering the rank aggregation scenario in which the
data curator is trusted, Hay, Elagina, and Miklau (2017) extended three non-private
rank aggregation algorithms to their differentially private versions.
In this paper, we intend to explore the methods to achieve differential privacy of the
Weighted Voting Game in a distributed scenario, which has not yet been researched.
2.2.2. Local Differential Privacy
There are some prior theoretical researches on Local Differential Privacy (LDP) model
and its related algorithms. Kasiviswanathan et al. (2008) proved that the equivalence of
learnability with RR-based LDP learning algorithms and statistical query (SQ) model,
and also showed the limitations of these algorithms in terms of the required amount
of data (exponential), as well as the less powerful learning ability in some situations.
Duchi, Jordan, and Wainwright (2012) studied the statistical convex risk minimiza-
tion problem under the LDP model and provided the bounds on the convergence rates
of the estimation procedure. In their subsequent research (Duchi, Jordan, and Wain-
wright 2013), they showed a more general results which are based on no mechanism
restrictions, and gave minimax-optimal error rates. Kairouz, Oh, and Viswanath (2014)
studied the privacy-utility trade-off between LDP and f -divergence utility functions,
and proposed the Extremal Mechanisms for maximizing utility. Lately, they studied
the secure multi-party computation in LDP model, and considered the interactive
setting and non-interactive setting (Kairouz, Oh, and Viswanath 2015, 2016).
Due to its unique reconstruction property that allowing the cloud server to esti-
mate population statistics from the collected noisy data of every single partner, RR
has been adopted in many researches on private data collection and analysis. The
RAPPOR was proposed by Erlingsson, Pihur, and Korolova (2014) to address the
differentially private frequency estimation problem which is considered in Google’s
Chrome web browser. Bassily and Smith (2015) theoretically proposed a protocol for
frequency estimation and finding heavy hitters in LDP model, by using the succinct
histogram (SH) to represent the data. Considering the heavy hitters over set-valued
data, the LDPMiner was proposed by Qin et al. (2016), which is based on Sampling
RAPPOR and sampling SH, and contained two phases to optimize the estimation
procedure. Under the data collection scenario of single binary attribute and multiple
polychotomous attributes, Wang, Wu, and Hu (2016) studied the relationship between
Laplace mechanism and RR by comparing their theoretical utility error and showing
the -differential privacy satisfaction results of RR. Sei and Ohsuga (2017) proposed
the S2M and S2Mb schemes, a kind of RR algorithm which require less number of
samples in estimation, to achieve privacy-preserving mobile crowdsensing. In the sce-
nario of privately local search the frequent records in a web search log, Avent et al.
(2017) proposed a hybrid differential privacy model in which the trusted curator model
and the LDP model are both considered. Wang et al. (2017) proposed a framework for
better comparing different LDP protocols. And two optimized protocols were proposed
on the basis of RAPPOR and SH. Recently, Bassily et al. (2017) proposed two locally
private heavy hitters algorithms TreeHist and Bitstogram to achieve better trade-off
among the utility, complexity and privacy, compared with RAPPOR.
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In this paper, we also intend to leverage the appealing properties of RR to meet the
stated privacy and utility requirements in cloud-based weighted voting game.
2.2.3. Discussion
As for solving the privacy issues in Cloud-based Weighted Voting Game, the existing
works mainly rely on the cryptographic approaches which always need the assumption
of a certain level of collusion tolerance, and/or the setting of additional trust server.
Moreover, the complexity caused by encryption and decryption also makes the related
schemes not so convenient for deployment. Although there are some researches on
differentially private voting game, none of them consider the specific privacy issues in
weighted voting game. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to apply
the lightweight RR technique to achieve local differential privacy in weighted voting
game while assuming that the involved entities are all semi-honest and the maximum
collusion may occur among them.
3. Problem Statement
This section first introduces the system assumptions considered in this work, and then
clearly presents the differentially private weighted voting game problem, along with its
challenges.
3.1. Assumptions and Problem Definition
We consider the scenario of the cloud-based weighted voting game. Because the con-
ventional weighted voting games always have no limits on the setting of the val-
ues of wi, and for the simulating the high, middle and low level decision-making
power in real-world scenario, in this paper we initially classify them into three groups
wI, wII and wIII, whose members’ weights are 1, 2 and 3, respectively. That
is, we have wI = {wj1 = 1, j1 ∈ [1,m1]}, wII = {wj2 = 2, j2 ∈ [1,m2]} and
wIII = {wj3 = 3, j3 ∈ [1,m3]}.
When the game is being created, the cloud server would first assign the proposal
candidates l ∈ K = {1, ..., k} for voting to the partners i ∈ N = {1, ..., n}, who
are associated with weights wi that belong to three weight groups (wI,wII, wIII).
Secondly, the partners would upload their opinions φi (value 1 for ‘yes’ and 0 for ‘no’)
respectively back to the cloud server. And finally, the cloud server would judge whether∑
i∈N wi · φi ≥ q and release the voting results to the partners.
In this system model, the cloud server and partners are all assumed to be semi-
honest, which means that they would be honest when providing their information for
the whole voting process and be curious about the sensitive information from others.
In the meanwhile, although those semi-honest 2 entities would not attempt to cheat
in all the interactive process during the voting, they would like to cooperate to gather
information out of the established protocol. Based on the above system assumptions,
we aim to address the following problem of differentially private weighted voting game:
Problem 1 (Differentially Private Weighted Voting Game). Given a weighted vot-
ing game G = [N ; w; q] which is developed by a semi-honest cloud server, design a
protocol that protects the weight wi and opinion φi of each semi-honest partner with
2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure˙multi-party˙computation
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-differential privacy. Moreover, the protocol should release an approximate accuracy
results that satisfy the minimization of given utility metrics.
3.2. Research Issues
In this paper, we aim to solve the differentially private weighted voting game prob-
lem by leveraging the Randomized Response (RR) technique, which brings two main
research issues:
How to tailor the RR to fit the problem? By analysing the process of weighted
voting game, we propose the rationale of a double RR mechanism to obtain the
frequency estimation of weights and opinions separately. And we further develop
a three-phase protocol DPWeVote whose details are described in Section 4.
How much the utility the protocol can maintain? We noticed that three inter-
mediate estimations cause the error of the final results in the proposed DPWeVote
protocol. Currently, we observe the maintained utility by empirical evaluations
in terms of the changing parameters and utility metrics in Section 5.
4. Private Weighted Voting Protocol
In this section, we propose a RR-based Differentially Private Weighted Voting
(DPWeVote) protocol, which not only ensures -differential privacy in each partner’s
data, but also allows the cloud server to be able to extract useful population statistics
information from the collected perturbed data.
4.1. Protocol Overview
The DPWeVote protocol actually consists of a series of interactive phases between the
distributed partners and the cloud server, which aims to collect and analysis the in-
formation of weights and opinions from partners in a private way. Because it requires
that each partner uploads his/her perturbed weight and opinion to the cloud server by
adopting RR mechanisms that satisfies local differential privacy, the potential privacy
leakage in the scenario described in Section 1 would be avoided. The overview of the
protocol is shown in Fig. 1.
We examine the involved computation operations and consider to solve the differ-
entially private weighted voting game in the following independent phases:
Randomized Weights Collection For permitting the cloud server to create a new
weighted voting game, the partners would first upload their perturbed weights
w˜i, which respectively belong to one of the three weight groups wI, wII and
wIII. Then based on the reconstruction property of RR, the cloud server would
estimate the unbiased number x̂wI , x̂wII and x̂wIII , and further computes the
approximate quota q̂.
Randomized Opinions Collection In this phase, the cloud server would first re-
quire the partners in weight group wI, wII and wIII to upload their perturbed
opinions φ˜ regarding whether they support the proposal candidates l. Then the
cloud server would estimate the unbiased number such as x̂wI,φY and x̂wI,φN ,
and further computes the approximate summation
∑
i∈N ŵi · φi.
Voting Results Release Based on the previous phases, the cloud server would have
10
Partners Cloud server
u Weights Perturbation by RR. ??
u Estimates ???? ? ????? ? ?????;
u Computes the approximate quota ?.
u Opinions Perturbation by RR. ???
u Estimates ??????? ? ???????;
u Computes the approximate 
summation ?? ??? ? ??.
u Judges whether ?? ??? ? ?? ? ?.
Figure 1. Protocol Overview
the ability to judge whether the approximate summation
∑
i∈N ŵi · φi is larger
than the approximate quota q̂. For each proposal candidates l ∈ K = {1, ..., k},
the above phases would be executed sequentially. The cloud server would finally
release the winner candidates list to the partners.
Details for the Randomized Weights Collection is presented in Section 4.2, followed
by the Randomized Opinions Collection in Section 4.3 and the Voting Results Release
in Section 4.4. The related privacy analysis is provided in Section 4.5.
4.2. Randomized Weights Collection
In the Randomized Weights Collection phase, it requires that on the one hand the
partners have the ability to deny their uploaded weights are the actual ones that
belong to certain group, and on the other hand the cloud server has the ability to
compute the approximate quota q̂ ≈ 12
∑
i∈N ŵi.
Next, we adopt the Randomized Response (RR) technique to ensure the above
requirements and formulate the problem as categorical data collection. For the sake of
simplicity, we use the extended version of the transformation matrix M proposed in
Warner scheme (Warner 1965) to represent the probability of reporting each partner’s
weight wi (belong to one weight group) in its original value or a modified version. The
transformation matrix of weights is formally described in the following:
Mw =
p1,1 p1,2 p1,3p2,1 p2,2 p2,3
p3,1 p3,2 p3,3
 =
 pw 1−pw2 1−pw21−pw
2 pw
1−pw
2
1−pw
2
1−pw
2 pw
 ,
where all the diagonal elements are assigned to pw and the rest of elements to
1−pw
2 .
Based on the above settings, the two protocols that involves interactions of the
partners and the cloud server can be further developed. The basic processes of these
protocols are shown in Fig. 2. Each partner i generates his/her perturbed weight w˜i
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locally by RR mechanism and uploads it to the cloud server. In the side of cloud server,
it observes that the noisy numbers ywI , ywII and ywIII , and attempt to estimate the
approximate numbers x̂wI , x̂wII and x̂wIII for further computing the approximate
quota q̂.
??
????
???? ?
???? ?
????? ?
????? ?
???
????? ?? ??
Partner 1
RR  
Uploads
??
Partner ? RR  
Uploads
???
??? ??? ????
???
?????
Estimates
Estimates
Estimates
??????????????
Figure 2. Randomized Weights Collection
Perturbation protocol We assume that each partner would upload his/her weight
value by a local RR application that provided by the cloud server. The appli-
cation contains the transformation matrix Mw and automatically generate and
upload the perturbed weight once the partner decides to join the voting game.
Reconstruction protocol When having collected the perturbed weights w˜i from
partners, the cloud server intends to compute the approximate quota q̂ by lever-
aging the obtained ywI , ywII and ywIII , which are the observed numbers of
partners who respectively belong to the weight group wI, wII and wIII. It is
important to reconstruct the numbers of partners who belong to certain weight
group by the following equation, which originates from Eq. 2:
−→̂
Xw = (Mw)
−1−→Yw, (3)
where
−→̂
Xw = (x̂wI , x̂wII , x̂wIII)
τ ,
−→
Yw = (ywI , ywII , ywIII)
τ , and (Mw)
−1 is the
inverse matrix of Mw.
Then the cloud server would be able to represent the quota q and compute
the approximate quota q̂ by the following equations:
(4a)
q =
1
2
∑
i∈N
wi
=
1
2
[wI · xwI + wII · xwII + wIII · xwIII ]
and
(4b)q̂ =
1
2
[wI · x̂wI + wII · x̂wII + wIII · x̂wIII ],
where x̂wI , x̂wII and x̂wIII are refer to the estimated numbers of the partners
who belong to group wI, wII and wIII, respectively.
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4.3. Randomized Opinions Collection
In the Randomized Opinions Collection phase, it requires that on the one hand the
partners have the ability to deny their uploaded opinions actually support or do not
support for the given proposal candidate, and on the other hand the cloud server has
the ability to estimate the summation
∑
i∈N wi · φi by computing the approximate
summation
∑
i∈N ŵi · φi.
Herein we also adopt RR technique to ensure the above requirements and we for-
mulate the problem as binary data collection this time. Firstly, we denote the opinions
of every partners are either φY = 1 or φN = 0. Then we use the naive transforma-
tion matrix M proposed in Warner scheme (Warner 1965) to represent the probability
of reporting each partner’s opinion φi in its original value or flipped version. The
transformation matrix of opinions is formally described in the following:
Mφ =
(
p0,0 p0,1
p1,0 p1,1
)
=
(
pφ 1− pφ
1− pφ pφ
)
,
where all the diagonal elements are assigned to pφ and the rest of elements to 1− pφ.
Based on the above settings, similar to the last phase, the two protocols that involves
interactions of the partners and the cloud server can be further developed. Taking the
weight group wI as an example, the basic processes of these protocols are shown
in Fig. 3. Each partner of weight group wI generates his/her perturbed opinion φ˜i
locally by RR mechanism and uploads it to the cloud server. In the side of cloud
server, it observes that the noisy numbers ywI,φY and ywI,φN , and attempt to estimate
the approximate numbers x̂wI,φY and x̂wI,φN . After the opinions from all the weight
groups are collected by the cloud server, it would have the ability to compute the
approximate summation
∑
i∈N ŵi · φi.
RR  
Uploads
??
RR  
Uploads
????
???? ?
???? ?
Estimates
Estimates
????? ?
????? ?
???
Partner.?? 1???
Partner.?? ??
??
? ???
??? ??? ????
???
?????
??????????????
Figure 3. Randomized Opinions Collection
Perturbation protocol Similar to the last phase, a local RR application provided
by the cloud server would help the partners automatically generate and upload
their perturbed opinions, based on the built-in transformation matrix Mφ.
Reconstruction protocol Taking the weight group wI as an example, when hav-
ing collected the perturbed opinions φ˜j1 from partners of wI, the cloud server
intends to compute the approximate numbers x̂wI,φY and x̂wI,φN by leveraging
the obtained xwI,φY and xwI,φN , which are the observed numbers of partners
who support and do not support the proposal candidate. It is important to re-
construct the actual numbers of partners’ bipartite opinions by the following
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equation, which originates from Eq. 2:
−−→
X̂φ1 = (Mφ)
−1−→Yφ1 , (5)
where
−−→
X̂φ1 = (x̂wI,φY , x̂wI,φN )
τ ,
−→
Yφ1 = (ywI,φY , ywI,φN )
τ , and (Mφ)
−1 is the
inverse matrix of Mφ.
In this way, the cloud server would also obtain
−−→
X̂φ2 = (x̂wII,φY , ̂xwII,φN )τ and−−→
X̂φ3 = ( ̂xwIII,φY , ̂xwIII,φN )τ . Then it would be able to approximately compute
the summation
∑
i∈N wi · φi by the following process.
Firstly, based on the collected weights, the expression of summation
∑
i∈N wi ·
φi can be written as the addition of each weight group’s opinions as shown below.
(6)
∑
i ∈N
wi · φi = w1 · φ1 + . . .+ wn · φn
= w1
∑
φj1 + w2
∑
φj2 + w3
∑
φj3
= wI · φwI + wII · φwII + wIII · φwIII ,
where φwI , φwII and φwIII refer to the summation of the opinions from each
weight group respectively.
Then the first term of the above expression can be computed as
(7)
wI · φwI = wI · [xwI,φY · φY + xwI,φN · φN ]
≈ wI · [x̂wI,φY · φY + x̂wI,φN · φN ]
= wI · x̂wI,φY ,
where x̂wI,φY is the estimated number of the partners who belong to the weight
group wI and support the proposal candidate.
Hence, the summation
∑
i∈N wi · φi can be finally represented and approxi-
mately computed by the following equations:
(8a)
∑
i ∈N
wi · φi = wI · xwI,φY + wII · xwII,φY + wIII · xwIII,φY
and
(8b)
∑
i ∈N
ŵi · φi = wI · x̂wI,φY + wII · x̂wII,φY + wIII · ̂xwIII,φY .
4.4. Voting Results Release
Finally, in order to judge whether the summation
∑
i∈N wi ·φi is larger than the quota
q, which indicates the proposal candidate’s winning or losing, the cloud server only
need to judge whether the approximate summation
∑
i∈N ŵi · φi is larger than the
approximate quota q̂.
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4.5. Privacy Analysis
Herein we will prove that the proposed DPWeVote protocol satisfies LDP.
As introduced in Section 2.1.3, the elements value of transformation matrix have
relationship with -differential privacy. We adopt the associated value in our proposed
protocol according to the following theorems proposed in Wang, Wu, and Hu (2016):
Theorem 4.1 (Binary Attribute Collection & DP). For a given differential privacy
parameter , the transformation matrix of randomized response scheme for binary
attribute collection should have the following pattern,
M =
( e
1+e
1
1+e
1
1+e
e
1+e
)
.
Theorem 4.2 (Polychotomous Attribute Collection & DP). For a given differential
privacy parameter , the transformation matrix M = {pj,i} of randomized response
scheme for polychotomous attribute collection should have the following form,
pj,i =
{
e
t−1+e ; if j = i,
1
t−1+e ; if j 6= i.
Based on the above theorems, we set
(9a)pw =
e1
2 + e1
and
(9b)pφ =
e2
1 + e2
,
where  = 1 + 2. Then we have the following theorem on the privacy guarantee of
the proposed protocol.
Theorem 4.3. The DPWeVote protocol satisfies -LDP.
Proof. Two independent phases regarding privately data collection of the DPWeVote
protocol can respectively satisfy relevant level of differential privacy as follows:
(1) For the Randomized Weights Collection phase, since we adopt a local random-
izer Rw to perturb and collect polychotomous attribute of weights and use the
following transformation matrix:
Mw =
p1,1 p1,2 p1,3p2,1 p2,2 p2,3
p3,1 p3,2 p3,3
 =
 pw 1−pw2 1−pw21−pw
2 pw
1−pw
2
1−pw
2
1−pw
2 pw
 ,
we then list the ratios between any pair of pu,u and pu,v as follows:
p1,1
p1,2
=
p1,1
p1,3
=
p2,2
p2,1
=
p2,2
p2,3
=
p3,3
p3,1
=
p3,3
p3,2
=
2pw
1− pw .
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Based on the setting under Theorem 4.2, we can obtain
Pr[Rw(wi = u) = u]
Pr[Rw(wi = v) = u] =
2pw
1− pw = e
1 .
In the meanwhile, all the ratios between any pair from pu,vi (where vi = 2 or 3)
equal to 1, which can be seen as e0. Based on Definition 2.7, we can conclude that
the Randomized Weights Collection phase satisfies 1-LDP where 1 = ln(
2pw
1−pw ).
(2) For the Randomized Opinions Collection phase, since we adopt a local random-
izer Rφ to perturb and collect binary attribute of opinions and use the following
transformation matrix:
Mφ =
(
p0,0 p0,1
p1,0 p1,1
)
=
(
pφ 1− pφ
1− pφ pφ
)
,
we then list the ratios between any pair of pu,u and pu,v as follows:
p0,0
p0,1
=
p1,1
p1,0
=
pφ
1− pφ .
Based on the setting under Theorem 4.1, we can obtain
Pr[Rφ(φi = u) = u]
Pr[Rφ(φi = v) = u] =
pφ
1− pφ = e
2 .
Then based on Definition 2.7, we can conclude that the Randomized Opinions
Collection phase satisfies 2-LDP where 2 = ln(
pφ
1−pφ ).
Consequently, according to the Sequential Composition which is shown in Theorem 2.6,
we can conclude that the DPWeVote protocol satisfies -LDP where  = 1 + 2.
5. Experiment and Analysis
In this section, we design experiments to evaluate the performance of the proposed
DPWeVote protocol by answering the following questions:
How does the DPWeVote protocol retain the utility? The DPWeVote protocol
aims to release voting results with acceptable utility. In Section 5.2, we will
examine its performance in terms of Accuracy and Mean Squared Error (MSE)
respectively on the intermediate estimations and the released results. The com-
parisons with a Laplace mechanism based baseline algorithm are provided.
How do the parameters affect the protocol performance? There are two pa-
rameters  and n involved in the DPWeVote protocol: privacy budget  controls the
overall privacy protection level of protocol; and n determines the total numbers
of the partners who participate in the weighted voting game. In Section 5.2.1
and 5.2.2, we will present and analyse their impacts on the protocol performance.
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5.1. Experiment Setting
5.1.1. Data and Configuration
We evaluate the DPWeVote protocol and the baseline algorithm on synthetic data, in
which the data of weights and opinions of each partner are i.i.d. generated from uniform
distribution. The generated weight data will be assigned to the three weight groups
wI, wII and wIII, while the generated opinions data to the two opinion groups φY
and φN . Besides, we set the size of each weight group or opinion group are same.
The DPWeVote protocol and the baseline algorithm are implemented in Python 2.7
codes and all the experiments are conducted on an Intel Core i5-3210M 2.50GHz
PC with 6GB memory. In each experiment, the protocol is executed 2000 times, and
its average score is reported. As to the setting of 1 and 2, for simplicity we make
1 = 2 = /2.
5.1.2. Experiment Parameters
We consider two parameters  and n since the performance of protocol could be affected
by them:
The privacy budget . Although the relationship between the privacy budget  and
the utility under the single RR mechanism has been investigated in previous stud-
ies, here we also expect to explore the situation in which the double RR mech-
anism are adopted. Besides, we will observe the performance of the DPWeVote
protocol in two scales of observation range: one is for  ∈ [0.1, 1.0], which is a
general range for evaluating differentially private algorithms; and the another is
for  ∈ [0.1, 5.0], which is a wider range for evaluating RR based LDP algorithms
as the previous studies (Wang, Wu, and Hu 2016; Qin et al. 2016; Wang et al.
2017; Bassily et al. 2017) adopted.
The number of partners n. The number of data contributors in single RR mecha-
nism always affects the final utility, as investigated in previous studies. However,
there is no guarantee for the double RR mechanism. Here, we aim to explore the
utility of final results and intermediate estimations of the DPWeVote protocol,
respectively. And we expect that the protocol could perform well even when n
is relatively small. Specifically, we set n = 10, 100, 500 when observing the re-
sults of DPWeVote with  ∈ [0.1, 5.0], and set n = 10, 50, 100 when comparing
DPWeVote with baseline algorithm at small , which is in [0.1, 1.0].
In our experiments, we will vary the above parameters to investigate their impacts
on the proposed protocol, in terms of the utility metrics as mentioned in Section 5.1.4.
5.1.3. Compared Algorithm
When varying  in range [0.1, 1.0], we consider a Baseline algorithm as the competitor
of the DPWeVote protocol. The baseline algorithm is based on the Output Perturbation
approach which introduces differential privacy by directly adding Laplacian noise to
the local original values of weight wi and opinion φi on each partner’s side.
For the perturbation of the weight of partner i, we use fw(·) to denote the weight
query function on i’s weight data whose size is one.
f˜w(i) = fw(i) + Laplace(
∆fw
1
).
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The added Lapacian noise is calibrated to ∆fw (the sensitivity of fw(·)), which is
equal to 2 since the maximum change of wi is resulted from the weight group changing
between wI and wIII.
Similarly, the perturbation of the opinion of partner i can be formulated as follows:
f˜φ(i) = fφ(i) + Laplace(
∆fφ
2
).
We use fφ(·) to denote the opinion query function on i’s opinion data whose size is also
one. The sensitivity of fφ(·) is equal to 1 since the maximum change of φi is resulted
from the opinion group changing between φY and φN .
In this way, the partners would first use baseline algorithm perturb their local data
and then upload. Based on these collected perturbed data, the cloud server would
calculate and release the final result. Since the baseline algorithm intuitively adds
coarse-grained noise to achieve differential privacy, we expect that it will underperform
the DPWeVote protocol.
5.1.4. Utility Metrics
We adopt the Accuracy and Mean Squared Error (MSE) to measure the utility per-
formance regarding the final results and intermediate estimations of the proposed
DPWeVote protocol and the baseline algorithm.
Accuracy. In general, Accuracy measures the systematic errors, which cause the dif-
ferences between the observed results and the true values. We aim to investigate
the systematic errors of DPWeVote by observing the statistical differences between
the estimated voting results and the actual ones in several tests. The accuracy
can be calculated as
(10)Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + FP + TN + FN
,
where TP is the true positive, FP is the false positive, TN is the true negative
and FN is false negative. Table 2 shows the semantics of these four variables.
Table 2. Semantics of TP, FP, TN and FN
TP
The number of test in which both the estimated voting result
and the actual one for a given proposal candidate are PASS.
FP
The number of test in which only the estimated voting result
is PASS the given proposal candidate and the actual one is NOT.
TN
The number of test in which both the estimated voting result
and the actual one for a given proposal candidate are NOT PASS.
FN
The number of test in which only the estimated voting result
is NOT PASS the given proposal candidate and the actual one is PASS.
Mean Squared Error (MSE). The Mean Squared Error (MSE) is a measure to
quantify the difference between an estimator and what is estimated. In general,
a lower MSE means a better utility the protocol can achieve. Herein we aim
to investigate the MSE of three intermediate estimations within the DPWeVote
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protocol as shown below:
(11)
MSEw = E[(
−→̂
Xw
n
−
−→
Xw
n
)2]
=
1
3
[(
x̂wI
n
− xwI
n
)2 + (
x̂wII
n
− xwII
n
)2 + (
x̂wIII
n
− xwIII
n
)2],
(12)MSEq = E[(
q̂∑
i∈N wi
− q∑
i∈N wi
)2]
and
(13)
MSEφ = E[(
−−→
X̂φY
n
−
−−→
XφY
n
)2]
=
1
3
[(
x̂wI,φY
n
− xwI,φY
n
)2 + (
x̂wII,φY
n
− xwII,φY
n
)2
+ (
̂xwIII,φY
n
− xwIII,φY
n
)2],
where n is the number of partners in N .
For the baseline algorithm, since it does not produce the intermediate estimations−→̂
Xw
n and
−−→
X̂φY
n , we will only focus on its MSEq (the MSE in terms of
q̂∑
i∈N wi
).
5.2. The Performance of DPWeVote
5.2.1. Impact of Privacy Budget
In this experiment, we set n = 10 and present the four kinds of utility measures of the
DPWeVote protocol when varying  from 0.1 to 5.0. Fig. 4(a) shows the accuracy over
synthetic datasets along with the change of privacy budget . Overall, we observe that
the DPWeVote protocol has higher accuracy when increasing , which is consistent with
the general law in differentially private algorithm design. Specifically, there is basically
a linear relationship between accuracy and .
For the MSE measurement, Fig. 4(a)(b) and (c) show the estimated proportions
of
−→̂
Xw, q̂ and
−−→
X̂φY in the related total quantity. We observe that the magnitudes
of MSE decreases sharply with a modest small  such as from the range 0.1 to 1.0.
Interestingly, although the MSE of the three intermediate estimations can be changed
significantly in exponential with varying , there have no such effect on the current
linear relationship between the final results’ accuracy and .
5.2.2. Impact of Partner Number
In this experiment, we present the performances of the DPWeVote protocol when
n = 10, 100, 500. Somewhat surprisingly, as shown in Fig. 4(a), the impact of partner
number on the final results’ accuracy is unclear. We suspect that this is due to the
possible internal offset effect within double RR mechanism, which should be further
studied in future.
In contrast, for the MSE measurement, Fig. 4(a)(b) and (c) show that the DPWeVote
protocol with a larger number of partners generally outperforms that with a smaller
19
(a) Accuracy (b) MSEw
(c) MSEq (d) MSEφ
Figure 4. (a) shows the Accuracy of the final results over synthetic data. (b)(c) and (d) show the MSE of
three intermediate estimations over the same synthetic data.
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number, although the differences become less obvious when the  is larger than 1.
Another observation is that the MSEq is very close to MSEφ from the aspect of
variation trends.
5.2.3. Comparison with Baseline Algorithm
For evaluating the differentially private algorithms in general range where  is usually
changed from 0.1 to 1.0, here we compare the performance of DPWeVote protocol with
that of baseline algorithm in a narrow range of , and set n = 10, 50, 100. Table 3 and
Table 4 present the comparison results in terms of accuracy and MSEq, respectively.
As to the results of accuracy, we see the trend that both of DPWeVote protocol and
baseline algorithm increased slowly when tuning  from 0.1 to 1.0. But obviously, the
results show that the DPWeVote protocol outperforms the baseline algorithm with a
larger growth rate. Besides, we also cannot find a clear effect by changing n.
Table 3. Comparison of the DPWeVote protocol and Baseline algorithm in terms of Accuracy
Accuracy  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
n = 10
Baseline 0.49440 0.50120 0.50125 0.50128 0.50140 0.51145 0.51185 0.51995 0.52025 0.52695
DPWeVote 0.50680 0.51265 0.51665 0.52675 0.53345 0.53700 0.54660 0.55505 0.55540 0.56840
n = 50
Baseline 0.50060 0.50043 0.50105 0.50415 0.50500 0.50985 0.51103 0.51120 0.51790 0.52135
DPWeVote 0.50795 0.50920 0.51725 0.52370 0.52550 0.53820 0.54690 0.55195 0.56060 0.56265
n = 100
Baseline 0.49840 0.50053 0.50150 0.50260 0.50450 0.50890 0.51195 0.51225 0.51300 0.52010
DPWeVote 0.50800 0.51340 0.51070 0.52335 0.53110 0.53630 0.54345 0.54510 0.55700 0.56310
The results of MSEq show that the baseline algorithm significantly underperforms
the DPWeVote protocol. And for a larger n, both of them get lower MSEq as expected.
Table 4. Comparison of the DPWeVote protocol and Baseline algorithm in terms of MSEq
MSEq  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
n = 10
Baseline 20.80675 5.18172 2.34181 1.31362 0.82597 0.59720 0.42769 0.33390 0.26256 0.20914
DPWeVote 15.82780 3.79594 1.68442 0.92401 0.59020 0.39621 0.28239 0.21623 0.16892 0.13490
n = 50
Baseline 4.00614 1.00797 0.44805 0.25437 0.16142 0.11203 0.08213 0.06390 0.04941 0.04070
DPWeVote 3.01404 0.74125 0.31822 0.17802 0.11303 0.07640 0.05671 0.04168 0.03253 0.02548
n = 100
Baseline 1.97664 0.50439 0.22056 0.12592 0.08012 0.05566 0.04160 0.03130 0.02509 0.01985
DPWeVote 1.48116 0.36118 0.16328 0.08678 0.05549 0.03759 0.02717 0.02070 0.01608 0.01292
5.3. Summary and Recommendations
The above experimental results basically verify that the proposed DPWeVote protocol
can preserve an acceptable utility while maintaining a relatively strong -differential
privacy. Due to the inner limitations of RR technique, which have been shown in
the previous research such as Wang, Wu, and Hu (2016) and Qin et al. (2016), the
DPWeVote protocol requires the  to be larger than 1 for getting better final results’
accuracy. Nonetheless, the DPWeVote protocol can always outperform Laplace mecha-
nism including the situations where the  is from a narrower range. This paper aims to
show a possible way to achieve differentially private weighted voting game by adopting
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naive RR techniques. In principle, it can be further optimized by carefully selecting of
RR transformation matrices, as well as by assigning the overall privacy budget  to 1
and 2.
6. Conclusions
In the light of Industry 4.0, Weighted Voting Game as a common form of decision-
making problem is being deployed into the could environment. However, the potential
privacy leakage within the cloud-based weighted voting game is an emerging issue that
must be addressed. Current research based on cryptographic approaches are limited
to some of the strong assumptions in their security model. This paper studies the pos-
sibility of achieving local differential privacy in a cloud-based weighted voting game
by using Randomized Response (RR) technique. Specifically, based on the semi-honest
cloud server/partners and the maximal collusion tolerance assumptions, we design a
three-phase protocol DPWeVote, in which the privacy of weights and opinions from each
individual can be protected separately in a double RR mechanism. In the meanwhile,
the empirical results show that the proposed DPWeVote protocol can maintain an ac-
ceptable utility under the recommendation for parameter setting. Compared with a
underperforming Laplace mechanism based baseline algorithm, the DPWeVote protocol
can be a potential solution to the differentially private weighted voting game.
We are eager to continue this work by exploring the related theoretical bounds
for double RR mechanism and the selection of parameters and RR transformation
matrices for optimization. And we also plan to consider the assumption that a certain
weight group may contain different weight values.
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